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IV Rio International Workshop on Advances in Competition Policy Analysis

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Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 30ᵗʰ November and 1ˢᵗ December 2026
Presentation

The Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE) and the Research Group in Law, Economics and Competition of the Institute of Economics – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (GDEC/IE/UFRJ) are organizing the IV Rio International Workshop on Advances in Competition Policy Analysis. The goal of the workshop is to bring together academics, policy makers and other practitioners specializing in the area of competition economics and policy to discuss the recent advances in the area.

CRESSE is an international network of academics and professionals, practicing in Competition or Regulatory Authorities, Consultancies and Legal Practices, with an interest in Competition Policy and Sectoral Regulation. In addition to the annual Annual Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference and Lawyers Week, CRESSE has organized and contributed to similar events in different countries.

GDEC is a research group on competition, law and economics and regulation, at the Institute of Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). The Institute of Economics is one of the leading centers for economic research and has a distinguished graduate program in economics in Brazil.

The Workshop will be held in English.

 

For further information, please contact us: gdec@ie.ufrj.br 

Call for Papers

NEW DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSIONS: 28 AUGUST

The IV Rio International Workshop on Advances on Competition Policy welcomes submissions of theoretical and applied papers on competition policy and regulation. 

Participants should submit either a extended abstract of no less than 700 words and no more than 1000 words or a full paper, written in English.

Submissions will be considered if submitted between 01 June and 28 August.

Acceptance will be announced by 13 September. Papers will be evaluated based on their contribution to the literature.

Presenters are required to submit the full paper by 19 November.

To submit, please click here.

Important Dates

01 June - Call for Papers (opening)

28 August - Call for Papers (deadline)

16 September - Selected Papers Announcement

19 November - Deadline for full paper submission (for approved presenters)

19 November - Deadline for registration (presenters)

26 November - Deadline for registration (other participants)

30 November and 01 December - Workshop

Registration

Registration is open, please click here.

Deadline for registration (paper presenters): 19 November

Deadline for registration (other participants): 26 November

Academics and Professionals - 600 BRL (until 19 November) - 650 BRL (after 19 November)

 

Graduate Students* - 120 BRL (until 19 November) - 130 BRL (after 19 November)
 

Undergraduate Students* - 50 BRL (until 19 November) - 55 BRL (after 19 November)

Please note that the conference management partner site charges a 5,99% fee for registration

* Graduate and Undergraduate Students: please send status proof to gdec@ie.ufrj.br after registering. Limited spaces available. 

Submission to Revista de Defesa da Concorrência

Presenters with approved papers for the workshop will have the option to submit it to a special session of Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, an open access peer-reviewed scientific journal edited by CADE (Administrative Council of Economic Defense) - the Brazilian Antitrust authority (https://revista.cade.gov.br).

Deadline: 25 January 2027

Accepted Papers
  • AIRLINE ALLIANCES, ANTITRUST REMEDIES, AND AIRFARES: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

  • Amazon's Sustainability Paradox: Non-Market Effects of Platform Market Power

  • Antitrust Beyond Efficiency: Lessons from South Africa

  • Civil Society Participation and Competition Enforcement in Digital Markets: Evidence from CADE's Apple App Store Case

  • Collusion in the Offshore FX Market: Evidence from the Brazilian Real

  • COMPETITION BETWEEN TV CHANNELS UNDER AN EXTERNAL SHOCK: THE CASE OF RUSSIA

  • Competition Policy and the Real Economy: Output and Employment Spillovers through Input–Output Linkages

  • Data intermediaries and competition concerns: an analytical framework

  • Data, Targeting, and Advertising Prices in Digital Platforms​

  • Dealer communication and collusive behavior in financial markets

  • Defining 'undertaking' in Brazil's merger control: asymmetries between notification and substantive assessment stages

  • Do Courts Undermine Interim Measures in Antitrust Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis of Brazilian Courts

  • Do Mergers Increase Drug Prices? Evidence from Brazil

  • Dynamic Effects of Mergers in Markets with Sunk Costs: Evidence from the Brazilian Ready-Mix Concrete Industry

  • Eating the Forest – Part II: The Brazilian Soy Moratorium and its challenges under competition law

  • Effects of Credit Cooperatives on the Banking Industry: Evidence on Market Structure in Rural Brazil

  • Effects of different fuel subsidy designs on prices and competition

  • ELECTRICITY MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN BRAZIL AND THE RETAIL SEGMENT: ANEEL–CADE INTERACTION IN MERGER CONTROL AND THE LIMITS OF PROPORTIONATE REGULATORY INTERVENTION

  • EVALUATING MERGER BETWEEN CONGESTED FACILITIES. THE CASE OF PORT TERMINALS

  • Every move you make − Collusive markers as network edges for cartel screening

  • From Obligation to Implementation: Vertical Interoperability in the Apple Case under the DMA and Lessons for Brazil

  • How Bundling Impacts Firms' Entry Decisions: Evidence from Broadband Internet

  • Identifying Edgeworth Cycles using Unsupervised Machine Learning

  • Industrial Policy and Competition: Sectoral Orientation, Horizontality and Selectivity in Nova Indústria Brasil

  • Innovation and Regulation in Digital Ecosystems: an ecosystemic view

  • Innovation Efficiencies and Evidentiary Tractability under the 2026 Draft EU Merger Guidelines

  • Kamikazes in Public Procurements: Bid-Rigging and Real Non-Market Outcomes

  • Market Concentration and Platform Regulation: Exploring Alternative Submission Criteria

  • Market Structure Effects of Supplier-Targeted Subsidies

  • Non-Competes and the Burden of Specification: Rethinking a Less Restrictive Alternatives Test for Employee Covenants not to Compete

  • Non-price effects of M&As in the app market

  • Optimal competition policy in developing vs. developed countries: the role of opportunity costs

  • Pix as a Public Financial Innovation Infrastructure: Competitive Impacts on the Brazilian Payments Market

  • Price Caps as Anchors? High-Frequency Online Evidence from Brazil's Pharmaceutical Retail Market

  • PUBLIC LEARNING, PRIVATE ADVANTAGE: COMPETITION-NEUTRAL DESIGN OF AI REGULATORY SANDBOXES

  • Punishing the Bad Guys: An Analysis of CADE's Penalties for Collusive Practices in Light of Its Dosimetry Guidelines

  • Recent developments in competition advocacy in Brazil: the Regulatory and Competition Assessment Procedure (PARC)

  • Reeling Under Reels: Addictive Design as Exploitative Abuse

  • Rivalry: CADE’s approach to non-price effects

  • Safe harbor for merger analysis under associative contracts: Azul and Gol´s codeshare case

  • The architecture of flexibility: Brazil’s Fair Digital Competition Bill in comparative perspective

  • The impact of FRAND requirements on the bargaining over patent royalties

  • The incorporation of data protection considerations into exploitative conduct assessment: what can South Africa learn from Germany and Nigeria’s cases against Meta

  • The Relationship Between Ex Ante–Ex Post Approaches in Digital Markets Regulation: The Case of the Brazilian Digital Competition Bill

  • The Turkish Competition Authority’s Empowerment with DMA-like Powers: Reinterpretation of Final Remedies under Turkish Competition Law

  • WHAT DOES ECONOMIC POWER MEAN? An Empirical Study of the Expression in Brazilian Competition Law Doctrine and Case Law

  • Who May Pay for What? Contracting Scope in Common Agency

Organizers

Coordinators 

Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro (GDEC/UFRJ)

Yannis Katsoulacos (CRESSE/Athens University of Economics and Business)

Local Organizing Committee

Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro (GDEC/UFRJ)

João Luiz Pondé (GDEC/UFRJ)

Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado (GDEC/UFRJ)

Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira Lyra (GDEC/UFF)

Graduate Student Co-Organizer

Gustavo Pietruza (UFRJ)

Scientific Committee

Beatriz Kira - University of Sussex

Camila Cabral Pires Alves – CADE/UFRJ

Cláudio Lucinda – USP

Diogo Coutinho - USP

Douglas Silveira - U Alberta

Ioannis Kokkoris – Queen Mary University of London

Liberty Mncube - U Witwatersrand

Maria Tereza Leopardi - UFRJ

Nicolo Zingales - FGV

Paulo Furquim - Insper

Svetlana Golovanova - HSE

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As fotografias foram gentilmente cedidas pela Prof. Maria Tereza Leopardi

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